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Skill biased technical change arrived to Hungary with the transition to market 
economy. As Hungary integrated into the international economy, technical change 
progressed much faster in some sectors than in mature market economies. That 
lead to increasing skill premia, intensive rent sharing, and additional benefits for 
workers at innovative firms. 
This paper analyses wage setting at Hungarian firms after the micro-economic 
restructuring and stabilisation period, in the years 1998-2006, with a special 
regard to wage determination at innovative firms. Wage setting is characterised 
by intensive rent-sharing. Premium at innovative firms varies with the way of 
measuring it, and also changes with the sector and over time. 
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A tudásintenzív technikai átalakulás az átmenettel érte el Magyarországot.   
Az átmenet időszakában nálunk lényegesen gyorsabb volt a technikai fejlődés üteme, 
mint a fejlett piacgazdaságokban.  Ez a képzettséghez kapcsolódó bérhozamok 
növekedéséhez és intenzív hozamosztozkodáshoz vezetett, aminek során az innovatív 
vállalatok dolgozói további juttatásokat is kaptak. 
A tanulmány az 1998-2006-os időszak vállati bérezési gyakorlatát elemzi,   
és kiemelten vizsgálja azt, hogy az innovatív vállalatok bérezése mennyiben tér el az 
átlagtól. A vállalatok bérpolitikáját intenzív hozamosztozkodás jellemezte.   
Az innovatív vállalatoknál fizetett többletbér nagysága ágazatspecifikus, és időben is 
változik, valamint erősen függ attól is, milyen szinten, hogyan mérjük. 
 
Tárgyszavak: innováció, hozamosztozkodás, vállalati bérmeghatározás 
 




  41. Introduction
Innovation may yield productivity gains and/or quality improvements in the output of a
rm, leading to higher prots. However, a rm, engaged in research and development,
needs employees able to work with new ideas, and adopt new methods. That requires
special talents, and rms have to attract talented people with special incentives. These
incentives may not only be higher wages: human resource management literature discusses
other methods, like creating the right physical and social environment at the workplace.
However, wage policy typically is one of the most important components of the package
oered to innovative employees. Human resource management (HRM) literature discusses
important details: how dierences in incentive schemes should re
ect the fact that research
and development typically requires team eort, or that intellectual property may have
dierent degree of vulnerability in dierent sectors.
Few people are able to innovate successfully. Those star performers, who can,
frequently are oered special benet packages. A small number of very talented persons
can change the fortunes of the rm, and innovative rms obviously want to attract and
keep such people. Andersson, et al. [2007], and [2008] borrow ideas from the HRM
literature. Using a large linked employer{employee dataset they show, how highly skilled
innovators can get very high rewards in competitive innovative sectors, like software
engineering.
Innovative rms, however, do not only need stars. All employees need to be 
exible
enough when new procedures are introduced, and the company has to adjust to the
novelty. That means that innovative rms need better quality labour, probably more
highly skilled one than others. That also means that the average wage of a typical
employee may well have to be higher at innovative rms.
When new technologies emerge, new skills may be needed, and those skills may be
highly rewarded for a while. Several people studied the eect of computerization on the
wage dierentials. However, such eects, if exist, can only be short-term: as the new
technology becomes part of the everyday operations, the extra benet will fade away, c.f.,
Entorf and Kramarz [1997] and Entorf et al. [1999]. There always are new technologies
demanding new skills. However, talented people can learn these skills, so innovative rms
need well educated, talented people, who can 
exibly adapt to new methods, techniques,
and acquire the necessary expertise. There are relatively few such people, so the company
will have to pay a premium for attracting and retaining them.
Rent sharing is an important ingredient of corporate wage policies. Companies
frequently share their prots, or the returns to productivity improvements with their
1employees. It may help to align corporate and individual interests, giving incentives to
eciency enhancement.
Traditional labour market studies rarely nd evidence of innovation related wage
dierentials among rms (e.g., Bruinshoofd et al. [2001]). The most important nding of
the related labour market literature is that skill biased technical change increases within
rm wage dierentials as it leads to higher skill premium for the highly trained employees
(c.f., Machin [2008]). That was also documented for Hungary by Kertesi and K oll} o [2002]
for the transition period. However, there is no sound theoretical foundation for expecting
an ever increasing skill premium in corporate wage setting (c.f., Card and DiNardo [2002]
vs. Acemoglu [2002]): it re
ects the specic features of the innovation process in the
past decades, and the shifts in the skill composition of labour demand and supply.1 For
example, Naticchioni et al. [2008] document declining skill premium in Italy in the past
15 years or so.
This study attempts to identify the eect of innovation on corporate wage setting
on two levels. A linked employer-employee dataset is used for analysing corporate wage
setting. However, characteristic features of the available data limit the scope of empirical
analysis.
First, a standard dynamic rm-level wage model, based on rent sharing and eciency
wage hypotheses, is augmented with innovation indicators. This analysis, however, has
to assume homogeneous labour, as the quality of labour can only be reliably measured
for a relatively small number of large rms. Similarly to other studies, we nd limited
evidence of innovation premium in the overall wage setting of the rm.
Second, we measure innovation specic wage premium at the individual level, using
an augmented human capital model. Unfortunately, this analysis has to be static due to
the specic features of the dataset. However, the human capital model is augmented
by rm, sector, and region specic variables, some also related to the research and
development eort of the rm. Here we nd substantial innovation related wage premium.
However, this premium changes over time substantially. Initially, innovative rms, sectors
paid higher wages to all employees. Since the late 1990's, however, innovation does not
only in
uences inter-rm wage dierences, but also intra-rm ones: we can only identify
innovation premium for highly skilled employees in several innovative sectors. Employee
level measurement also helps to identify the role of other factors, like wage dispersion,
changes in the valuation of human capital.
The characteristic features of the dataset play important role in the empirical work.
Section 2 discusses these data issues. Section 3 discusses hypotheses and the common
1 Brown and Campbell [2002] couples a theoretical discussion of this issue with an extensive literature survey.
2building blocks of the models. Section 4 presents results from the rm level analysis,
while Section 5 discusses those at the individual level. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
The paper uses a linked employer{employee dataset, with annual observations for the
period 1992{2006 for Hungary, with additional information from an annual innovation
survey since 1998.
The rm dimension is a panel, but employees are not identied over the years, thus
the consecutive cross sections cannot be linked into a panel. Company information mostly
consists of balance sheet data, supplemented with basic ownership, etc. information, also
supplemented with regional and sectoral aggregates. The rm sample covers more than
50000 rms every year. It is strongly biased towards large rms; it covers roughly 90% of
exports and value added, and well over 80% of employment. It covers all rms involved
in research and development activities. However, employee information is only available
for something like 15% of the rms in the sample, tilted towards large rms.
The corporate dataset does not dierentiate labour: we only have total (full-time
equivalent) employment and total wage bill, including premia. Thus an analysis based on
this information has to assume homogenous labour.
The employee sample represents roughly 10% of the employees of these rms.
The employee dataset consists of around 100000 observations annually: roughly 5% of
corporate employment in Hungary. Employee information comes from the HR records
stored at rms, thus it covers training, position, remuneration, etc., but it does not
include family background and similar variables unknown to the rm.
The dataset details labour income by categories. As the corporate dataset consists
of the total wage bill, here a comparable measure of wage was calculated: the benet
adjusted monthly wage, where one twelfth of annual premia were added to the monthly
remuneration.
The innovation survey concentrated on research and development; all rms reporting
research and development expenditures are covered. Innovation obviously is a much
broader concept than R&D, however, other type of innovation activities are only available
for a subset of rms, and unfortunately the common subset of the employee sample and
the broader innovation survey sample is relatively small.
As the innovation data are only available for the 1998-2006 period, the sample for
the empirical analysis starts with 1999, but the set of instrumental variables included
observations from 1996.
3The identication of R&D intensive sectors is based on the OECD classication:
pharmaceuticals and high tech engineering. High-tech engineering consists of Aircraft and
spacecraft; Oce, accounting and computing machinery; Radio, TV and communications
equipment; and Medical, precision and optical instruments sectors; c.f., OECD [2007],
Appendix.
3. Assumptions and model specication
Several factors may in
uence corporate wage setting. Obviously, their importance is an
empirical issue. This paper starts with a general specication incorporating most of these
assumptions, thus their relative importance can be assessed.
The key assumption of our analysis is that companies share yields of productivity
gains, or prots with their employees (c.f., Katz and Summers [1989]). Rent sharing may
be the result of bargaining with monopolistic (unionised) labour. However, companies
may not yield to insider power unwillingly: rent sharing may be part of their prot
maximisign strategy as an incentive to increase productivity.
Rent sharing is frequently explained by changes in protability, e.g., Arai [2003].
However, this paper rather follows the tradition of sharing the yield of productivity
improvements, as those are more directly linked to innovative eort. Nickell and Wadhani
[1990], in a seminal paper on British corporate wage determination, developed a dynamic
adjustment model, where rms share the yields of productivity gains with their employees.
Trade unions routinely refer to productivity growth in wage negotiations, so that is a more
obvious channel of rent sharing. Productivity is measured by labour productivity (per
employee value added).2
Nickell et al. [1994] extended the previous model, incorporating the eect of variables
describing the intensity of product market competition and market position of the rm
into the wage equation. They demonstrated that the favourable market position also was
subject to a similar bargaining, and market power had a positive impact on wages in
Britain. This positive impact also depended on rm size: trade unions were stronger at
large rms, and thus, they have a stronger bargaining power against the management.
Dominant rms were less likely to use unemployment pressure for limiting wage growth,
thus making the wage curve eect conditional on rm size. Other studies also found
that market structure and competitive pressure (e.g., import penetration), or exposure to
2 Productivity measurement is a complex issue. A quality adjusted total factor productivity measure would
be also be possible. However, that is not the measure used at bargaining. Besides, labour productivity gave
better, more stable empirical results.
4foreign product markets may in
uence wage setting behaviour, e.g., Abowd and Lemieux
[1993], or Kramarz [2003].3
Successful innovators can increase productivity and raise the quality of products and
services, which enables them to charge higher prices. If the company is willing to share
these yields with employees, higher and faster improving productivity may result in higher
average wages at innovative rms. Wages may also be in
uenced by the need of hiring
better, more talented and more 
exible employees. These unobserved quality dierences
may increase `normal' returns to human capital at innovative rms. That is especially
true at rms involved in research and development (c.f., Allen [2001], Andersson et al.
[2007] and [2008]). However, innovative rms also have to oer additional benets as an
incentive to dedicated work.
This paper uses an R&D activity indicator for measuring innovation eect. However,
research and development, innovation are complex processes, which may in
uence wage
setting in several ways. Benets may be linked to some output measures, thus innovation
eect may interact with productivity improvement: that is, innovative rms may share
rents with their employees dierently, than the average rm.
Obviously, in most cases only a relatively small fraction of employees play an
important role in research and development. These people typically are highly trained
professionals with very high human capital. The innovation premium may thus be strongly
linked to the education premium. However, rms involved in research and development
may want to spread benets more widely, to create a positive environment.
Firms operating in sectors with strong research and development component fre-
quently are multinationals. The location of research and development is decided at
corporate headquarters. Innovation may come from the foreign branch of the rm,
but it may still in
uence wage setting at the whole corporation. Thus, innovation
premium is also measured at sectoral level at the manufacturing sectors with research
and development intensive activity. A wage premium in these sectors may just be a
spill-over eect of innovative rms, but it is likely that many rms in these sectors transfer
innovation from other, foreign subsidiaries. This sectoral eect may not be uniform in
all innovative sectors: pharmaceutical rms may protect intellectual property better with
pattents than engineering enterprises, thus the innovation eect may be dierent in these
sectors.
The inter-relationship of rent sharing and innovation premium is the main subject of
our empirical analysis. However, there are several other factors studied in the literature
which may also strongly in
uence corporate wage setting.
3 It is interesting to note that they estimated opposite eect of foreign market exposure on wages: while Abowd
and Lemieux [1993] found a positive, Kramarz [2003] a negative eect. The two models were substantially
dierent: Kramarz could also take into account individual human capital endowments. It may just be a
selection eect: rms under strong competitive pressure may have to employ better labour.
5Larger rms are more likely to share rents and employ eciency wage strategies. Firm
size is usually measured by the number of employees. (Bayard and Troske [1999])
It is not always optimal to fully adjust wages to the actual prices and production
decisions. Strong arguments support the eciency wages hypothesis (c.f., Akerlof [1982]
and Akerlof and Yellen [1986]) that adjustment is partial and slow. Thus, wage setting is
a dynamic process.
Production decisions also depend on wages and on quality of labour. Basically
employment and wage are jointly determined by the use of other productive inputs, and
all depend on the actual demand for the products and services of the rm, given market
prices. All these inter-related variables have to be treated endogenously.
A well-known and robust result of Hungarian labour market studies is that the type
of ownership plays an important role in wage dierentials at employee level, which
cannot be attributed to standard explanatory variables of the human capital model.
Kertesi and K oll} o [2002] also showed that ownership structure changed the eect of other
factors determining individual wages: while wages were strongly in
uenced by rm size
at foreign-owned companies, productivity dierences were more important at domestic
rms. Foreign-owned companies paid relatively larger wage premium in low-wage sectors;
thus, sectoral wages are less dispersed at foreign-owned employees than at domestic
ones. They attributed a substantial part of ownership related sectoral wage dierences
to this relative advantage of low-wage sectors. Earle and Telegdy [2008] attribute some
of these dierentials to selection eect, but they still nd substantial wage premium at
foreign-owned rms.
Ownership-related dierences were also observed in some other transition economies.4
For example, Dobbelaere [2001] showed that foreign-owned rms paid higher wages in
Bulgaria, but those wages were independent of the eciency, thus, they did not share
rents with their employees. Wages at state-owned enterprises, on the other hand, were
strongly linked to productivity. However, foreign-owned rms seem to have dierent
wage setting strategies in dierent transitional economies. Damijan and Kostevc [2002]
analysed whether foreign investment had a positive eect on wage catch-up in transition
economies. Their main result was heterogeneity: while they found a strong positive
impact for Bulgaria and Hungary, the relationship was reversed in Estonia and Romania,
and FDI had no signicant eect on wages in Slovenia.
Several empirical papers, written on corporate wage setting in Poland found that the
very intensive rent sharing was not independent of the ownership structure of the rms.
(Christev and Fitzroy [2002] and Bedi and Cieslik [2002]) That sort of interaction is also
tested for Hungary.
4 The wage eect of foreign ownership is not transtion specic, e.g., Aitken et al. [1996] found persistent foreign
owner wage premium for Mexico, Venezuela and USA, although with dierent characteristic features.
6Regional wage dierences are large and persistent in Hungary. The wage curve hy-
pothesis of Blanch
ower and Oswald [1994] oers a plausible explanation for this regional
dispersion of average wages. They suggest that dierences in regional unemployment rates
strongly in
uence wage setting in the corporate sector. Kertesi and K oll} o [1997] showed
the fast growing role of local unemployment in wage setting in the early 1990's. Regional
unemployment exerted an increasingly negative eect on wages in the competitive sectors.
Our main hypothesis is that there was an intensive rent sharing in the Hungarian
economy, which may also be related to innovation eort.
Our initial model specications attempts to encompass all above assumptions and
hypotheses in some form. Two separate models are analysed at two dierent levels:
rst a dynamic wage determination model is estimated at the company level, second an
augmented human capital model is estimated at the individual level.
The corporation level model explains average real wage dierentials (incl. all premia)
among rms.
The estimated model (at rm level):
ln(W) = f(ln(Wt 1);ln(Pr);ln(Prt 1);Innov;ln(Pr)  Innov;X) + "
where W denotes wages, Pr is labour productivity, Innov is the indicator variable
for research and development activity, and two sectoral variables for pharmaceuticals
and high-tech engineering measure possible spillover eects from innovative neighbours
and/or foreign branches of the rm. X includes employment, local unemployment ratio,
ownership (foreign and private), export share in sales, competitive pressure variables
(market share, sectoral concentration index, and import penetration), together with
meaningful interactions and time xed eects.
The intensive transition period was over by the late 1990's in Hungary. However,
K} or osi [2007] found substantial structural breaks over time in the Hungarian corporate
wage setting behaviour for this sample period, especially around 2002. There also were
substantial sectoral dierences. Because of this observed heterogeneity, the model should
be estimated for specic subsamples, as the pooled estimation may be misleading.
Many variables are individually and jointly insignicant. Many studies use individual
(rm) xed eects to account for possible bias for omitted variables. However, as the
model has to be estimated for short samples because of the structural break, xed eects
are not feasible.
As output, employment and wage decisions are the consequences of the same
optimization process at the rm, wage, employment, output, exports, productivity, and
all related variables (for example, market share, or various interactions) were treated as
endogenous variables, using the system-GMM estimator (c.f., Blundell and Bond [2000]).
7Unfortunately, at employee level we only have a series of cross sections, thus static
models are used. But we also have human capital variables. An augmented Mincerian
model is estimated, where the above rm specic factors are taken into account.
ln(W) = f(Ed;Ex;ln(Pr);Innov;X) + "
where W is the benet adjusted monthly wage of the employee, Ed is educational
attainment, measured with the type of nal qualications, Ex is experience, measured
in years. The innovation measure is either the previous research and development
indicator, or a dierentiated measure, where future, new, and past innovations are also
distinguished.5 X also includes gender, indicator for type of location (town, capital), and
interactions with human capital variables, on top of variables used in the corporation level
model. Equations are estimated by OLS. (Productivity does not seem to be endogenous,
the Hausman test is not signicant, when using rm specic instruments.)
The key dierences between the two levels of measurement are: rst, labour has
to be treated homogeneously in the rm level model, thus variations in the quality of
the labour employed by various rms may show up as dierences in rent sharing, or
some other components related to the quality of labour; second, as rm level models are
dynamic, and coecients are basically estimated from dierences (system-gmm estimates
coecients partly from the dierenced equation and partly using dierenced instruments),
xed eects are largely eliminated, but those xed eects do in
uence the estimation of
the static individual level model.
4. Results 1: Firm level
The wage equation is estimated for various subsamples: all rms, manufacturing, and the
two research intensive sectors: engineering and chemical industry. Table 1 summarizes
estimation results.6 The sample period was 1998-2006, but the model estimated for the
full sample is strongly aected by a structural break; the estimates for the 1998-2001
and 2003-2006 subperiods are signicantly dierent from each other, and have better
properties. When the model is estimated for all rms, or the manufacturing rms, the
specication is rejected by the overidentication test. That most probably is due to the
5 Future indicates that the rm had not been involved in previous activity before, but it conducts research in
the next year. New indicates the rst year of R&D activity. Past indicates that the rm innovated until the
previous year, but it no longer does research. These variables proved irrelevant in the rm-level model.
6 Legend to Table 1: Estimation is by (system-)gmm with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
Productivity, employment and R&D activity are endogenous. Additional controls include local unemployment,
market structure variables, ownership, various interactions, and time dummies. Asterisks after the coecients
and test statistics indicate that the test is signicant at 0.05 level () or at 0.01 level (). Overidentication
test is the Sargan test; A{B 2
nd autocorr is the Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation; the joint test is the
signicance test for all variables, except time dummies, omitted from the table (Wold test, 
2; time dummies
usually are signicant at the 0.01 level); Chow test tests for a structural break by the joint signicance of the
dummy premultiplied variables (Wold test, 
2).
8sectoral heterogeneity in wage determination, especially in rent sharing. The Sargan test
typically is insignicant for sectors.7
Rent sharing is the dominant driving force of wage determination. Dynamic
adjustment is an important component of the model. Research and development activity
plays a limited role in wage setting, if we measure it at the rm level. The direct eect
is usually positive, but marginal, however, the spillover eect seems to be ambiguous.
The interaction of productivity and innovation is never signicant. However, when the
equations are estimated without the innovation related variables, the coecients for the
productivity change signicantly, which shows that innovation plays an important role at
the rms: it not only in
uences corporate wage determination, productivity is even more
strongly in
uenced by research activity.
Wage negotiations typically concentrate on changes instead of levels. For example,
trade unions typically refer to productivity growth, and attempt to get proportional
increases. However, the estimated dynamics is dierent, it cannot be converted to simple
dierences.
The estimated model includes 41 coecients for various variables, interactions, plus
the coecients representing the time xed eects. Time xed eects almost always
are signicant|macroeconomic conditions changed a lot during this period|, but other
variables, omitted from Table 1, usually are insignicant. The few signicant coecients
seem to be randomly distributed; there is no variable which was signicant in both
subperiods in both sectors.8 However, omitting all insignicant coecients changed some
signicant values, so their eect is not negligible, although insignicant.9
I paid a special attention to foreign ownership. Foreign-owned rms pay much
higher wages than their domestic competitors, and empirical studies of Hungarian wage
dierentials typically found substantial foreign owner premium. However, ownership did
not play an important role in the estimated dynamic wage equations, neither on its own,
nor when looking at its interactions with other variables. It appears that higher wages were
consistent with the higher productivity of foreign-owned rms. I also tested ownership
related structural break, as in Poland, for example, wage setting was dierent at domestic
7 The equation was also estimated for other sectors, but research activity is rare in other sectors. As the focus of
this paper is the inter-relationship of rent sharing and innovation, I concentrate on the sectors with substantial
R&D.
8 Given the large number of coecients, some tests really should be signicant|every twentieth on the average,
when using the 0.05 level|even if the true value of the coecient is 0.
9 Kertesi and K oll} o [1997] found signicant wage curve eect before our sample period. Local unemployment also
was signicant in Polish wage equations. It is insignicant here, even though there are substantial regional wage
dierences in Hungary. However, the regional distribution of unemployment situation has been very stable
since the mid-1990's. As wages already adjusted to dierences in unemployment levels before our sample,
these dierences are already incorporated into lagged wages, and local unemployment does not seem to exert
additional pressure on wages.
9Table 1: Wage determination: dynamic equation at rm level
Variables 1998{2006 1998{2001 2003{2006
All rms
log lagged wage 0.52  0.59  0.45 
log of productivity 0.35  0.55  0.44 
log of lagged prod. -0.24  -0.34  -0.25 
R&D activity 0.06  0.09  0.05 
High-tech engineering 0.03 0.00 0.02
Pharmaceuticals -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 
log of employment -0.10  0.01  -0.06 
Joint test 2
34 192.4  53.5  22.0
Chow test 2
41 83.3 
Nob 430483 225819 152373
A{B 2nd autocorr 3.83  -3.83  2.17 
Overident. test 14751.4  9818.7  1828.1 
Manufacturing
log lagged wage 0.52  0.55  0.44 
log of productivity 0.41  0.43  0.42 
log of lagged prod. -0.25  -0.25  -0.22 
R&D activity 0.04  0.05 0.02 
High-tech engineering 0.01 0.06  0.01
Pharmaceuticals -0.05 0.09 -0.12 
log of employment -0.06  -0.04  -0.06 
Joint test 2
34 52.3  34.6 25.3
Chow test 2
41 102.0 
Nob 95715 48930 34716
A{B 2nd autocorr 1.23 -2.92  -0.32
Overident. test 439.0  254.1  166.5 
Engineering
log lagged wage 0.51  0.57  0.40 
log of productivity 0.50  0.53  0.43 
log of lagged prod. -0.26  -0.28  -0.18 
R&D activity 0.03  0.08 0.00
High-tech engineering 0.04  0.01 0.04 
log of employment -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 
Joint test 2
34 65.0  14.4 48.0 
Chow test 2
40 72.6 
Nob 32779 14863 13341
A{B 2nd autocorr 2.04  -0.13 -0.30
Overident. test 1422.4  95.0  58.6 
Chemical industry
log lagged wage 0.52  0.46  0.47 
log of productivity 0.33  0.41  0.27 
log of lagged prod. -0.20  -0.17  -0.20 
R&D activity 0.04 0.03 0.04
Pharmaceuticals -0.04 0.20 -0.15 
log of employment -0.05 0.02 -0.09 
Joint test 2
34 22.3 24.6 15.2
Chow test 2
40 43.7 
Nob 8424 3762 3480
A{B 2nd autocorr 0.34 -1.66 -0.33
Overident. test 84.6  56.3  17.7
10and foreign rms, however, that also was insignicant in the sectoral estimates.10 That
probably re
ects the much higher penetration of foreign investors into the Hungarian
corporate sector: foreign-owned companies set the pace for all rms in the Hungarian
economy, so domestic rms cannot have dierent remuneration policies.
5. Results 2: Employee level
The static individual level wage equations are estimated for each year separately. Two
alternative results are presented, which only dier in measuring innovation eect: Table 2
summarizes the baseline results for the period 1998-2006; estimates presented in Table 3
only dier in treating changes in innovation activity: three additional variables measure,
how the innovation strategy of the rm changes. Figures 1-4 also highlight some tendencies
in Table 2.11
When estimating employee level static models, there are strong structural breaks
among consecutive years. Interestingly, the sectoral structural breaks become much less
important; they are insignicant in several years, and even if signicant, sectoral estimates
do not dier that much. Thus for these equations an annual pooled regression was
estimated. Labour had to be assumed to be homogenous in the corporate level wage
model. As the skill composition of labour varies strongly among sectors, this sort of
heterogeneity obviously showed up as sectoral dierences in wage determination.12
Several variables became signicant in the static regressions, which were insignicant
in the rm level dynamic model. First and foremost, foreign ownership becomes a
very important variable in static regressions, explaining a substantial fraction of wage
dierentials.13 Clearly, foreign rms pay higher wages mostly because the dynamic
adjustment process plays a dierent role in domestic and foreign rms.
Employment, and local unemployment are also signicant in these static regressions,
although the wage curve eect is very unstable over time, and more importantly, over
alternative specications. That indicates that the omission of the dynamic adjustment
really changes the characteristics of the wage model.
10 This structural break is signicant in the entire sample and in the manufacturing sector, but that most probably
is due to a composition eect, as the share of foreign-owned rms varies over sectors, and there are substantial
dierences among sectors.
11 Legend to Tables 2 and 3: Estimation is by OLS with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Additional
controls include market structure variables, location, and various interactions. Asterisks after the coecients
and test statistics indicate that the test is signicant at 0.05 level () or at 0.01 level (). The joint test is
the test for all variables omitted from the table (Wold test, 
2); Chow test tests for a structural break by the
joint signicance of the dummy premultiplied variables for the previous year (Wold test, 
2).
12 Galizzi [2005] discussed the eect of changes in the composition of labour.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Figure 1 Returns to education
Figure 2 Foreign ownership premium and productivity elasticity
Fast skill-biased technical change resulted in very high returns to tertiary education.
Several studies, including Kertesi and K oll} o [2002] found that the gap increases ever since
the late 1980's. However, our innovation augmented model qualies that result. The
returns to education did not change that much over time in these estimates. So the
increasing skill premium may be due to a higher share of innovative rms, and a larger
importance of innovation premia, which is mostly payed to highly skilled employees.
Estimated rent sharing is less intensive in the static model, part of the rent-sharing
eect is clearly taken up by the ownership structure. Rent sharing is not directly related
13Figure 3 Innovation premium
Figure 4 Pharmaceutical industry and high-tech engineering with R&D
to skills, but innovation premium is much bigger for highly educated people. Spill-over
estimates are very sensitive to the inclusion of the innovation variable, and the pattern
seems to shift from a general innovation premium at the beginning of the sample period
to a skill specic innovation premium towards its end.
When looking at the eect of innovation dynamics, an interesting picture emerges
(c.f., Table 3). Firms starting research and development paid 5 to 15 percent extra
premia in their rst year of innovation eort until 2003 on top of the the regular premium
14Table 3: Wage determination: Static equation at employee level
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gender 0.13  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.14  0.13  0.14 
Experience 0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02 
Exp2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Vocational 0.12  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.07 
Secondary 0.36  0.30  0.28  0.30  0.29  0.28  0.29 
Tertiary 0.93  0.84  0.80  0.83  0.80  0.81  0.82 
Productivity (log) 0.21  0.24  0.20  0.18  0.17  0.21  0.18 
R&D 0.07  0.22  0.13  0.12  0.14  0.22  0.14 
Future R&D 0.34  0.12  0.16  0.23  0.18  0.18  0.12 
New R&D 0.15  0.16  0.07  0.05  0.08  -0.03  -0.02
Past R&D 0.30  0.14  0.34  -0.01 0.28  0.11  0.36 
R&DTertiary 0.06  0.02 0.12  0.09  0.12  0.10  0.12 
Pharmaceutical 0.03 -0.18  -0.02 -0.07  -0.15  -0.03 -0.02
PharmaTert. -0.02 0.12  -0.03 0.09  0.01 0.02 -0.01
High-tech engin -0.02  0.06  0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.09  -0.07 
High-techTert. -0.07  0.07  0.09  0.03 0.06  0.05  0.05
Foreign 0.28  0.30  0.29  0.26  0.28  0.29  0.32 
Employment (log) 0.09  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.06 
Local unemp. 0.01 -0.15  -0.12  0.01  -0.05  0.02  -0.14 
Joint test 2
43 84.3  151.4  193.2  82.2  129.1  89.4  141.4 
Chow test 2
62 824.3  855.2  199.4  491.5  242.7  543.2 
Nob 104661 118091 119417 114996 124527 137569 139125
R2 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.49
paid by rms engaged in research and development activity. However, more importantly,
rms preparing to start research activity increased wages substantially; before 2003 they
paid higher premium than those already engaged in R&D activity. These rms, planning
to innovate, had to attract workers able to do creative work, and obviously they oered
high wages to them.14 On the other hand, when a rm stops research and development,
it still continues to pay higher wages; obviously, adjustment takes time, as wages, and
also wage dynamics may be rather rigid downwards.
6 Conclusions
Rent sharing is much more intensive in Hungary than in developed market economies.
Innovative rms pay an extra premium to their employees, especially to the highly skilled
ones. Non-innovative `neighbouring' rms may also have to oer somewhat higher wages,
thus innovation premium may spill over to these rms, although that eect is very unstable
and somewhat ambiguous. In a static model foreign-owned rms seem to pay hefty premia,
14 Future R&D indicates that the rm starts R&D the year after. The next year is indicated by New R&D, when
the rm actually started to innovate. Past R&D indicates that a former innovator is no longer engaged in
research activity.
15however that basically is the consequence of ignoring dynamics: it re
ects the fact that
multinationals are more innovative and dynamic.
Innovation has direct and indirect eects on wage determination. Firms with research
and development activity increase productivity faster, thus they increase wages faster
even with the same rent-sharing intensity. This eect may increase wage dierentials
even without a direct innovation premium. Innovative rms do pay signicantly higher
wages than those not involved in research and development; however, these higher wages
are usually consistent with faster productivity growth, more dynamic development of the
rm, thus when taking the dynamic adjustment process into account, that eect becomes
dicult to measure. Another problem of rm level measurement of the innovation eect is
that the innovation premium is unevenly distributed within rm: highly skilled employees
get the most. As we cannot know the skill distribution from the company level data, that
eect is poorly measured.
Table 4: Employment ratios of the population aged 25-62 by education, 1998 (%)
Men Women
Share of All ISCED Di- All ISCED Di-
ISCED levels 0/1 & 2 erence levels 0/1 & 2 erence
0/1 & 2
Hungary 33 69.1 37.1 32 53.9 31.6 22.3
Poland 24 75.9 57.4 18.5 60.5 40.7 19.9
Comparators
Austria 28 80.7 65.3 15.4 60.3 45.1 15.2
Finnland 28 76.2 61.6 10.9 69.8 57.8 12
Czechia 16 82.9 57.6 25.3 63.4 41.8 21.6
Comparators
Danemark 20 84 69 15 73.2 55.7 17.5
Germany 19 76.9 62.5 14.4 59.7 40.4 19.3
Source: Education at a glance, OECD, Paris, 2000, Tables A2.1b and E1.1{E1.2.
However, the high rent sharing intensity is a curious fenomenon in Hungary. The
usual explanation is that strong trade unions bargain with employers for the rent. Trade
unions are very weak in the Hungarian corporate sector. The more plausible explanation
is that relevant skills are rare in Hungary, and innovative and productive rms have to pay
high wages just to attract and keep the few really able, properly skilled workers. Table 4
compares the employment probability of poorly educated people in Hungary to the same
in some other small European countries. It is clear that there are more poorly educated
16people in Hungary than in the other countries, and their skills are much less useful: their
employment chances are much worse than in the comparable economies. Thus, there is
a clear skill shortage in Hungary, and innovative, productive rms have to compete for
the few properly trained people. That explains why Hungarian rms are more willing to
share rents with their employees than rms in most other economies, and why innovative
rms pay relatively high innovation premium.
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